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The Importance of the European Union’s 
 Strategic and Diplomatic Cultures 
 
Colette Mazzucelli
♣
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper identifies culture as a variable underlying the establishment of a distinct policy area in 
the European Union (EU). An inquiry into the evolution of strategic culture in the Union must 
reference the agreement taken by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in 1998 at Saint-Malo. Why did 
these two leaders take a step in the direction of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)? 
Do structural or institutional explanations trump the cultural analysis?  
In each case, the decision taken may be explained with reference to the culture of the 
country in question. Each leader was confronted with a tension between the need for his state to 
continue participation, to varying degrees, in the European integration process and the reluctance 
or indifference of the national population toward this objective. Culture is a variable that must be 
taken into account to explain the contestation resulting from gap between national leaders’ 
attempts to define their states’ medium to long-term interests at the center of European Union 
policymaking and the populaces’ attitudes of disinterest or downright hostility to these goals.     
   
Culture and Its Discontents 
 
Relatively few studies identify culture in comparative political analysis to explain the dynamics 
of interaction in the larger European Union.
1 The choice of a cultural perspective, and not a 
structural or institutional account, is justified by the choice of cases this paper analyzes. Its 
analysis strives to explain the reasons for the decision taken by Blair and Chirac at Saint-Malo. A 
structural account places the emphasis squarely on the security considerations and constraints in 
the international system. An institutional account demonstrates the extent to which actions flow 
from conditions of path dependence.  
The Saint-Malo decision laid a cornerstone for the establishment over time of a European 
Security and Defense Policy, which makes the emergence of a European strategic culture or a 
European Security and Defense Identity a distinct, though distant, possibility. The definition of 
strategic culture used here is that of Longhurst as ‘…a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and 
practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise 
gradually over time, through a unique and protracted historical process. Strategic culture is 
persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a 
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permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either 
fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences’.
2  
The argument in this paper is that during the 1990s, like in preceding decades, each 
nation-state in Europe reacted to systemic change in its own way. Stanley Hoffmann, writing in 
the early 1980s, explained that each nation-state confronts crisis ‘according to its own political 
culture’.
3  This interpretation differs from the dominant structural one, in which culture is at best 
derivative of the distribution of capabilities and has no independent explanatory power. For 
rationalists, actors deploy culture strategically, like any other resource, simply to further their 
own self-interests.  
In the run-up to Saint-Malo, Blair and Chirac each had to consider the impact on their 
respective domestic contexts of the Union’s policies, which have expanded in function and scope. 
This paper makes the case that the Saint-Malo agreement must be explained with reference to 
culture, not structure or institutions, and not primarily in a security or defense context. The 
analytical point of departure is that the decision made by each national leader involved 
argumentation. Tensions were not exclusively or primarily among national elites. Contestation 
was driven by differences between elite and popular conceptions of each member state’s 
commitment to the European Union. The point of reference in this analysis is a national one, 
which answers the initial question as to why Prime Minister Blair changed policy at Saint-Malo.
4  
 
The Road Less Traveled By: Saint-Malo 
 
The Blair Government’s Volte Face. Late in 1998 Blair reversed the long-standing British 
position and accepted the French preference to implement a European Strategic Defense Identity 
(ESDI) under the aegis of the European Union. At the time the Blair government was not able to 
join the single European currency project, the Euro, owing to domestic opposition among the 
British elite and populace.
5  Nor was Britain a member of the Schengen group, whose original 
members, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, agreed to the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders.  After years of Conservative rule, Labour’s 
challenge was to establish Britain’s constructive influence in core matters of European Union 
policymaking while influencing domestic opinion on this matter in a pragmatic way.   
Although the new Prime Minister’s economic commitment to the Union was strong, 
Britain risked being left behind as momentum to create the Euro increased.   Blair understood it 
was necessary to establish his party’s credentials in Brussels. Opposition to the Euro, however, 
resulted in a loss of control over monetary union as the British had to settle for observer status in 
talks addressing currency management. The British wait and see strategy to join the Euro had 
substantial economic consequences as ‘…the pound soared on currency markets, damaging 
industry’s competitiveness and raising the threat of recession’.
6 This was the price of assuaging 
public opinion. 
Britain’s six-month Presidency of the Council, which began in January 1998, gave Blair 
the opportunity to experience first-hand the Union’s internal divisions over the Euro as well as 
public apprehension regarding future enlargements after the 1995 accession of Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden. The British public exhibited anxiety about the unknown, namely how anticipated 
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enlargements would change their lives. Timing was critical. Domestic popular support for EU 
membership was on the wane when Blair needed to affirm his country’s interest in a larger Union 
on the verge of making a qualitative leap in monetary integration.   
In a March 1998 address before the French National Assembly, Blair expressed his 
concern about this decrease in public support.  In that speech, he recognized the need for 
leadership and vision as a national leader with the responsibility to play a proactive role shaping 
popular opinion about the European Union. Blair’s remarks also highlighted defense as an area 
for cooperation in which Britain and France ‘can and should do more together’.
7  B l a i r  
emphasizes particular national attitudes about the use of force, which, in turn, indicates his 
perception of the strategic importance of defense cooperation with France in an EU context. 
Blair affirmed his support for the European Union through a British initiative in defense 
cooperation. His aim was to develop ESDI jointly with the French as an EU policy area, which 
appealed to a domestic audience as a national and a European project.
8 Blair’s commitment to the 
Europe Union was expressed with reference to distinct national traditions, which lend Britain its 
specificity: parliamentary sovereignty, transatlantic solidarity, and popular accountability. From a 
pragmatic standpoint, it was also increasingly clear to Blair that ESDI was going nowhere, and 
that without a new impetus provided jointly with France, defense policy would neither be 
substantive nor European.
9 There had to be a collective presence to mobilize peer pressure among 
member states, avoid the inefficiency of uncoordinated, ad hoc, initiatives, and allow domestic 
publics to identify with a project viewed nationally as a positive sum game of global significance. 
Most importantly, the United Kingdom and France were diverse enough in their views to create a 
negotiating space for other member states of the Union to join an emerging ESDI.
10 As a 
consequence, the Saint-Malo Declaration derived legitimacy from cultural differences as well as 
military strengths, which Britain and France respectively brought to the table.  
The Chirac Government’s Popular Dilemma. In contrast to the British prime minister, 
Chirac faced unexpected domestic constraints during the 1990s, particularly in the context 
immediately preceding the Saint-Malo agreement. Since the national referendum that just barely 
insured the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992, France was confronted 
with internal challenges to what had traditionally been perceived by the country’s elite as a 
popular consensus in support of the country’s participation as a founding member in European 
construction.
11 There were two issue areas that alienated the French populace in the period 
leading to Saint-Malo in late 1998: the fulfillment of the economic convergence criteria necessary 
to join the EMU and enlargement of the Union to include the countries to the center and east of 
the Continent.      
In accordance with the Treaty on European Union, France had to fulfill five criteria to 
join the Economic and Monetary Union in the first wave. The most notable criteria is a country’s 
ability to attain a budget deficit of less than 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). After his 
election in 1995, Chirac and his newly appointed prime minister, Alain Juppé, confronted a 
budget deficit, 6% of GDP, which could have left France out of an EMU core. Juppé’s task was 
to draft and implement a plan to cut the budget deficit by almost half – to 3.5% – within a year. 
The steps toward economic convergence incurred a heavy social cost, which provoked a negative 
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8 Conley, p. 83. 
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11 Colette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union 
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  5  6
reaction from the French public. Consequently, the Chirac government’s popularity suffered a 
sharp decline.
12 The strikes and labor unrest that resulted led Chirac in hindsight to make one of 
the most blatant political miscalculations of his career. His sudden call for an early election in 
spring 1997 aimed to release the president from domestic political pressure in the years to come 
during his initial seven-year tenure. This breathing room was essential as Chirac sought to 
reassert France’s leadership of Europe and reappraise its role in a reformed North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). The strategy resulted instead in ‘five years of futile cohabitation with a 
contentious Socialist majority in the French National Assembly, thereby stalling Chirac’s grand 
designs for Europe and the alliance’.
13 The government’s defeat and Juppé’s swift departure left 
Chirac to confront a population hostile to the Maastricht agenda.  
The increasing popular dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policy was not 
the only European challenge Chirac had to face. The French public’s feelings about the Union’s 
enlargement to central and east Europe were decidedly negative regarding particular countries. 
Only the accession of Poland and Malta was viewed favorably by the French with the population 
divided evenly about eventual membership for Hungary. 1998 Eurobarometer survey data 
indicate that citizens expressed an overwhelming disapproval of future European Union 
enlargement to Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania.
14  Expansion had the support of the French government, which Chirac articulated as 
follows: “Enlargement is both a moral duty and an opportunity for Europe.”
15 In this statement, 
the French president sought to define the state’s long-term interest in European terms. This 
objective is reflective of traditional French policy toward European construction from the 1950s:  
the country is strengthened economically and politically as integration proceeds in those policy 
areas that are in France’s vital interest. 
The Chirac government considered the Economic and Monetary Union and enlargement 
as the next critical steps in the European construction process. For Chirac, the dilemma was 
fundamentally one of national leadership in an era dominated by the choice France had made for 
Europe.   
The strategic importance of EMU and enlargement to the French state was contested not 
only by elite personalities, but, more significantly, by an increasing majority of the country’s 
population. Gueldry’s analysis is particularly relevant in this context: ‘…French opponents to the 
single currency blame the stringent convergence criteria for the abdication of monetary 
sovereignty, the crisis of the welfare state, the loss of productive investment and soaring 
unemployment.’
16  The 1992 referendum revealed that it was no longer possible to count on 
voters automatically casting their votes in accord with established political and socio-economic 
affiliations. Chirac had to contend with the increasing volatility of the French electorate, which is 
connected with an acute crisis of confidence in established political parties.
17                 
Despite his personal reluctance, Chirac cast his vote for the Treaty on European Union 
“as a personal choice” not as chairman of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). His 
embrace of a pro-Maastricht policy in winter 1995 when his Conservative prime minister tried to 
curtail public expenses and social benefits drove a wedge between Chirac and nationalistic 
Gaullists. Those faithful to traditional Gaullism castigated the loss of French policy alternatives. 
Gueldry explains; ‘…The denunciation of the social costs of European unification in a pro-
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Fourth Annual Conference des Ambassadeurs,” The Independent (London), 3 September 1998, p.4, 
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Maastricht blueprint provides easy political ammunition to demagogues in a country suffering 
from a social crisis and an identity crisis.’
18  The crisis must be analyzed in the cultural, historic 
context dating back to the French Revolution during which ‘…Intolerance also fed on 
socioeconomic differences, especially since the French felt a “violent and inextinguishable hatred 
of inequality.”’
19 Differences exacerbated among classes in French society as a result of the 
march toward the single currency, and situate an analysis of France’s Revolution in a modern 
context:  
…“Poverty worked to sharpen all jealousies and all hatreds on all sides”; and 
the prosperity that succeeded it increased discontent further and caused “hatred 
against the old institutions [to grow]. The nation [took] visible steps toward a 
revolution.” Violence was the result not of poverty as such but of the frustration 
associated with it….
20 
 
The concern of the Chirac government in late 1997 and early 1998 was that the French 
public expressed fundamental differences about the desirability of French participation in the 
European Union.  In this context, the time was ripe for a high profile European initiative that 
would influence public opinion. The level of support for membership in the European Union 
among the French public declined from 66% in the spring of 1990 to 48% in the fall of 1997 and 
50% in the spring of 1998.
21 The agreement between Blair and Chirac at Saint-Malo in December 
1998 may be analyzed as a project to foster an affinity with the European Union among the 
French populace. In other words, Conley analyzes Saint-Malo as ‘an identity-building project 
[that] was Chirac’s method of choice’.
22 Such a project was time sensitive: in the atmosphere that 
emerged in the 1990s, the French were hostile to the EMU criteria, opposed to future 
enlargement, and less favorable to membership in the Union than in previous decades.    
 
Explaining Saint-Malo in Context 
  
Of the explanations offered in analyses of the development of ESDP, three are prominent in the 
literature: the natural expansion of integration as a process; Europe’s desire to balance against the 
United States; and the pragmatic needs of crisis management in a new security environment since 
the end of the Cold War.
23  
This paper addresses the query as to why ESDP emerged in the late 1990s. The point of 
departure is an inquiry that questions the reasons for the change in British policy under Prime 
Minister Blair. In this context, my argument is that Blair wanted the United Kingdom to take the 
lead in a key policy area – defense – that he believed would bring his country into the mainstream 
of influence in European policymaking alongside France and Germany. This argument, which is 
fundamentally different than those in the literature, locates the explanatory factors on the national 
level. This is not, however, simply the basis of a fourth narrative of ‘old European power politics 
and competition between nation-states recast in new circumstances’.
24 The explanation is 
sensitive to context and timing: Blair needed to establish solid domestic support for the European 
Union at a time when Britain was in no position to join the first wave of EMU. Elite and public 
contestation regarding the Euro was strong. Blair also wanted to establish a British commitment 
and ‘determination to use European instruments to achieve some of its foreign policy goals and to 
                                                           
    
18 Gueldry, p. 7. 
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develop a more interventionist foreign policy in terms of crisis management and conflict 
prevention around the globe’.
25  
  Since the late 1990s, the evolution of British and French security policies may be 
explained, as Lantis writes, ‘as a product of domestic political adjustments (rooted in culture, 
traditions and common historical narratives) to changing international circumstances’.
26 This 
does not discount another explanation, which is the challenge of post-Cold War crises in the 
Balkans, as a motivation for Blair and Chirac to agree in Saint-Malo.
27 Changes introduced by 
globalization impact on traditional national strategic cultures, which in turn contribute to 
European initiatives, like the Saint-Malo revolution demonstrates for ESDP.  
  In terms of the ‘presence’ of ideational elements prior to Blair’s action at Saint-Malo, 
Blair had to contend with the United Kingdom’s established Atlanticism and ‘non-European’ 
sense of identity, which its cultural and historical experience defined. There was a need to address 
the unresolved conflict over the very notion of European integration. Unlike their Conservative 
predecessors, the Labour Party aimed to overcome its traditional reticence about European 
integration since the end of World War II.
28 Labour’s conversion to a pro-European policy 
occurred during the 1990s under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and later John Smith. There are 
several explanations for the shift from the policy of withdrawal that was articulated in the 1983 
manifesto, including: the ‘shift of the trade union movement to support for integration’; the 
‘failure of socialism ‘in one country’ in France’; and ‘the shift to pro-Europeanism on the part of 
several key figures in the party’.
29 Labour was adept at exploiting European policy in an 
opportunistic way while in the opposition. The divisions within the Conservative Party, and 
particularly within the second Major government, in power from 1992-97, were exploited by 
Labour as the country ratified the Treaty on European Union. As the Major’s government’s 
relations with other European Union member states deteriorated, a new group of young leaders, 
including Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson, heightened the willingness to realize 
Britain’s interest in the European context.  
  Blair’s objective was to reform Europe with Britain in the lead of the renewal. The 1998 
British Presidency of the Council did not offer him the opportunity to bring the European Union 
closer to the domestic public. Despite positive achievements over the six-month tenure in the 
Chair, the British Presidency did not register any enduring result by involving the British people 
in the integration process. An initiative with France emphasizing defence allowed Britain to play 
a key role, which was visible to the larger public, and underscored Britain’s importance as a 
bridge that arguably was achieved on Kosovo.
30 The objective was to secure British domestic 
support for Europe’s Union by making the population witness Britain’s role between Europe and 
the US as ‘a pivotal power at the crux of international politics’.
31 Blair’s action to reach the 
bilateral agreement with Chirac at Saint-Malo later that year reflected these ideas. In Quinlan’s 
view, Blair’s underlying judgment was ‘at root a tactical one about what was the best route 
towards getting something substantial achieved in the collective defence field, not a strategic 
switch to accept the Euro-aspirations of Gaullisme.’
32    
                                                           
    
25 Miskimmon, p. 14.   
    
26 Jeffrey S. Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,’ Strategic Insights Volume IV, Issue 10 
(October 2005): 7    
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29 Ibid, p. 6. 
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Research Working Paper Series Number 12 (Birmingham: European Research Institute, 2006), p. 8. 
    
31 Ignazi, p. 7. 
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  Chirac’s journey to Saint-Malo must be explained with reference to the French interest to 
develop a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including defense. This policy 
area, in which national sovereignty figures most prominently, is one in which successive French 
presidents have embraced a traditional Gaullist objective: to speak for Europe.
33 The case of 
France is illustrative of the cultural argument that the decision taken at Saint-Malo cannot be 
explained simply as: 1) the natural expansion of integration as a process; or 2) Europe’s desire to 
balance against the United States.  
First, Saint-Malo was a decision that confirmed the intergovernmental nature of defense 
policy as part of the European Union’s second pillar, CFSP. As Paul Luif argued, ‘…Learning 
processes and spillover effects do not seem to have the same strength in the intergovernmental 
cooperation of the EU’s second pillar as in the supranational first pillar’.
34 Chirac’s agreement 
with Blair at Saint-Malo was about ‘a policy for common decision making, yet one in which no 
country would ever be bound to participate.’
35 The French president underlined that the 
realization of a European security and defense policy provides the foundation for a European 
identity because the undertaking is the expression of the national interest.  
Secondly, it is not entirely accurate to equate the French viewpoint, which is expressed 
with a distinctive voice, with ‘anti-American, anti-NATO, proto-Gaullism.’
36 In different periods 
of history when crises arose, for example, the stationing of missiles in Cuba, France aligned with 
the United States and the West. During the 1990s, France’s relations with NATO drew closer as 
the Alliance underwent a significant transition after German unification and the fall of the Soviet 
Union. French elite opinion is not monolithic, however. The anti-American, anti-NATO strand of 
thought is one among many. As Quinlan perceives this strand, ‘in defense matters France is most 
truly and proudly herself when she is disagreeing with the United States and distancing herself 
from NATO as being an unhealthily US-dominated organization.’
37 Despite this inclination, 
which is culturally ingrained in the French worldview, the challenge for France when the ESDP 
project was defined at Saint-Malo, was to convince the United Kingdom, and then the US and 
other EU member states, that ESDP and NATO were mutually reinforcing.
38  
   During the 1990s, the Western European Union (WEU) together with NATO assumed 
responsibility for peacekeeping operations in support of United Nations missions in the former 
Yugoslavia. The 1996 NATO Council meeting in Berlin led to an agreement to intensify 
cooperation within the ESDI framework. Although the initial intention was to strengthen the 
European pillar within NATO, French and British initiatives subsequently built on the Saint-Malo 
foundation, which aimed to determine the European capacities for crisis response missions. As an 
integral part of the French identity-building project, Chirac’s decision at Saint-Malo illustrated 
that the pragmatic needs of crisis management in a new security environment since the end of the 
Cold War were visibly addressed in the eyes of the French public. The deliberate choice of this 
policy capitalized on the French domestic support for a common European defence. It also 
underlined the popular belief that defence efforts should be undertaken by the European Union.
39 
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35 Conley, p. 107. 
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38 Thierry Tardy, ‘National Threat Perception: Survey Results from France,’ Garnet Working Paper No. 18.5, May 
2007, p. 11. 
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  As the leader of a large state, for which independence of action in security and defence 
policy is a matter of national identity, Chirac’s decision at Saint- Malo preserved French 
sovereignty in this area.  This is a distinctive national concern, which engenders no substantial 
contestation at home, and indicates the extent to which a European strategic culture is dependent 
on the evolution of genuinely common interests and the willingness of states to accept a 
‘coordination reflex [that] tends to narrow down the range of actions envisaged by member 
states.’
40  Chirac demonstrated the consistency in French security policy since Saint-Malo by 
maintaining this ‘philosophy of independence’.   
The philosophy of independence is indicative of a structural rather than an instrumental 
style of European governance.  This is a style that reflects the traditional authority of the state in 
France and the role of the president in the institutional set up of the Fifth Republic.  French elite 
perspectives on ESDP since Saint-Malo have been intricately related to French popular 
uncertainty about integration and globalization as two sides of the same coin.
41  There is one 
constant from the 1992 Maastricht referendum through the 1995 labor unrest regarding the Euro 
until the 2005 rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty: domestic opinion reveals 
significant differences between the French elite and population. French leaders have consistently 
highlighted the benefits to the national population of European security initiatives, which speaks 
to their identity-building function in the Saint-Malo context.
42   
In the French case, the requirement to shore up domestic opinion indicates that the 
support for ESDP is pursued in the national interest and is unlikely to engender the expansion of 
integration. Nor does ESDP make sense as a purely military policy to balance against the United 
States. As a response to the differences inherent between elites and the public about European 
integration, the Saint-Malo agreement provided a foundation to create a European strategic 
culture with the potential to ‘generate the political momentum to acquire capabilities.’
43 A 
European strategic culture is a necessary element in the Union’s development as a distinct polity 
to manage globalization in the 21
st century. Its evolution allows the member states to address 
popular concerns about integration by constructing a European identity that responds in the public 
eye to the pragmatic needs of crisis management in a new security environment.   
After the Saint-Malo agreement and prior to the Iraq controversy, Cornish and Edwards 
explained this potential development in the following way:  ‘As the EU comes into contact with 
‘zones of intractable conflict’, and given the policy connection between development and 
security, an EU strategic culture will become increasingly valid. Limited military forces could 
reasonably be used by the EU to pursue goals which rightly fall within its scope of action and 
which complement other areas of Union activity. By these means, the EU will develop a unique 
strategic culture which begins to serve its needs and aspirations (as expressed in the Helsinki 
initiative) and which neither forecloses later evolution of the European capability (even, if desired 
and affordable, into the EU’s own defense alliance), nor-importantly-rivals NATO in scope or 
style.’
44   
In hindsight the Saint-Malo decision illustrates Hyde-Price’s argument, which underlines 
diversity as the source of member state differences: ‘Despite Robert Kagan’s intentionally 
provocative writings counterposing of a more pacific ‘European’ strategic culture to that of the 
USA (Kagan 2002 and 2003), the fact is that European attitudes to the use of force are 
                                                           
    
40 Christopher Hill, ‘European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model – or Flop?’ in The Evolution of an 
International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness ed. Reinhardt Rummel with the assistance of Colette 
Mazzucelli (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 33. 
    
41 Colette Mazzucelli, ‘The French Rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty: Two-Level Games Revisited,’ 
in The Rise and Fall of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty ed. Finn Laursen (Nijhoff/Brill, 2008). 
    
42 Conley, pp. 115-16. 
    
43 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic 
culture,’ International Affairs 77, 3 (2001): 603.  
    
44 Ibidem 
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characterized by considerable heterogeneity. These differences cannot simply be attributed to 
relative power differentials, but reflect the diversity of European history, geography and culture. 
This diversity has led to the emergence of different strategic cultures and foreign policy role 
conceptions, which are only loosely and indirectly related to material power capabilities. The UK 
and France, for example, are similar in terms of their relative power capabilities, but have pursued 
different policies toward transatlantic relations and the Iraq War.’
45 
The decision taken at Saint-Malo made the evolution of a European strategic culture 
possible. This analysis explains that the Saint-Malo agreement was made in order to maintain the 
momentum to establish Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the cornerstone of the European 
Union’s burgeoning diplomatic culture, at a time when popular support for integration was in 
question. This is an explicit rejection of the spillover thesis, which underlines the specificity of 
Britain and France at Saint-Malo. 
 
The Union’s Revolution: Strategic and Diplomatic Cultures in the Making 
 
The cultural analysis in this paper highlights elite-mass contestations that were a necessary 
impetus for key decisions on European defense policy by the leaders of two large European 
member states.  These decisions aimed to establish a European identity with which national 
populations could identify. This is significant because the defense area is likely to illustrate if the 
Union emerges as a 21
st century strategic and diplomatic actor with its own distinct culture 
relative to the United States, China, and others in the world. 
 
 
 
    
45 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force,’ in Old Europe, New Europe and 
the Transatlantic Security Agenda eds. Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (London and New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), pp. 138-39.   